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NOTES
Miller v. Kite: Should Domestic Disputes Require the
Maximum of Minimum Contacts?
As early as 1799 a North Carolina district court judge asserted the State's
commitment to a restrictive application of in personam jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants. In declaring invalid a 1784 legislative act holding "wicked and
ill disposed persons, resident in the neighboring states" liable in North Carolina
for their acts of counterfeiting North Carolina bills of credit,1 Judge Taylor re-
marked: "The States are to be considered, with respect to each other, as in-
dependent sovereignties, possessing powers completely adequate to their own
government, in the exercise of which they are limited only by the nature and
objects of government, by their respective constitutions, and by that of the
United States."'2 For close to two hundred years the attempt to balance respect
for state sovereignty with the need to reach those "ill disposed" nonresidents
who injure residents has been debated in federal and state courts and
legislatures.3
In Miller v. Kite4 the North Carolina Supreme Court reexamined the bal-
ance between state sovereignty and a state's right to protect its residents, this
time in the context of a domestic relations dispute. The court concluded that a
North Carolina court may not exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident father in
an action for increased child support when the father's only contacts with the
State are his monthly child support payments mailed to a state resident and his
occasional trips to the State to visit his child. By confining itself to a strict
minimum contacts analysis developed primarily from tort and contract cases,
the court failed to consider the special character of family relationships and the
public policy arguments in favor of sustaining jurisdiction.
This Note examines the analytical framework North Carolina courts use to
determine whether the State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
1. State v. Knight, 1 N.C. (ray.) 144 (1799) (quoting Act of the 1784 North Carolina General
Assembly, 1st Sess., ch. 25, reproduced in 1 PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH
CAROLINA 355 (J. Iredell & F. Martin ed. New Bern, N.C. 1804)).
2. Id. at 144.
3. See generally 4 C. WRIGTrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1064-
1073 (1969 & Supp. 1985) (noting transition in jurisdictional principles from territorial basis to due
process basis and considering future trends of personal jurisdiction); Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a
Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429 (1981) (criticizing de-
fendant-oriented approaches to personal jurisdiction and arguing for a more balanced analysis);
Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi in Rem and In Personam
Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147 (tracing the development of jurisdictional principles through
changes in the Nation's physical setting, economic needs, and judicial resources); Kurland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer
to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958) (discussing the decline of federalism as an
issue in personal jurisdiction questions); Note, Jurisdiction Over Non-residents Doing Business Within
a State, 32 HARv. L. REV. 871 (1919) (discussing problems of state jurisdiction over businesses when
physical presence or consent are the grounds for jurisdiction).
4. 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663 (1985).
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dent defendant and how that framework is applied in domestic relations cases.
It concludes that the liberal exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in a domestic relations case does not violate the defendant's right to
due process. Finally, this Note endorses an expansive approach to the minimum
contacts question in domestic relations cases and addresses the policy considera-
tions in support of such an approach.
Barbara and Dennis Kite were married in Illinois in 1967 and had a child
there in 1968.5 The Kites separated in 1971 and, pursuant to a separation agree-
ment, plaintiff wife took custody of the child. Defendant agreed to pay three
hundred dollars per month for child support. Shortly after plaintiff and defend-
ant divorced in 1972, plaintiff and the child moved to North Carolina, where
they resided until 1982.6 Defendant remained in Illinois until 1977; he later
lived in Texas and California. Defendant mailed monthly support checks to
plaintiff at her North Carolina address and made several visits to his daughter
between 1973 and 1981.
7
In 1982 plaintiff filed an action for increased child support in Buncombe
County District Court in North Carolina. When the action was filed, defendant
was domiciled in California, but was a resident of Tokyo, Japan, where he was
an officer with Bank of America. 8 After conducting a hearing at which defend-
ant was not present, the trial court entered an order modifying the child support
agreement and ordered defendant to pay eight hundred dollars per month in
child support. 9 Defendant then appeared specially to move that the order be set
aside as void due to lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of his motion de-
fendant filed affidavits showing that his only contacts with North Carolina were
the mailing of monthly support checks and his occasional visits. The trial court
found that it could properly exercise jurisdiction over defendant and denied the
motion.10
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
noting that defendant's contacts included his daughter's nine-year residence in
the State, his support payments sent to plaintiff in North Carolina, his visits to
the State, his formal agreement that the child would reside with the mother, and
his own benefits from the North Carolina laws that protected his child.'I The
court concluded that "[ulnder the circumstances there is nothing unfair about
5. Id. at 475, 329 S.E.2d at 664.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 475-76, 329 S.E.2d at 664.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 476, 329 S.E.2d at 664. In his findings of fact, Judge Israel indicated that the in-
creased support was based on a demonstrated change in the child's needs and on evidence of defend-
ant's increased ability to pay. Thejudge noted that at the time of the divorce, defendant was earning
a salary of $950 per month and receiving $300 per month in dividend and interest income. The
evidence showed that at the time of the hearing he was earning in excess of $50,000 per year. Record
at 11-12, Miller v. Kite, 69 N.C. App. 679, 318 S.E.2d 102 (1984), rev'd, 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d
663 (1985).
10. Miller, 313 N.C. at 476, 329 S.E.2d at 665.
11. Miller v. Kite, 69 N.C. App. 679, 318 S.E.2d 102 (1984), rev'd, 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d
663 (1985).
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adjudicating this child's needs from the defendant in our courts."' 12
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, ruling for the first time since
1979 on a domestic case in which the sole issue was personal jurisdiction. In
concluding that defendant's contacts were insufficient to justify in personam ju-
risdiction, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court's minimum con-
tacts analysis in Kulko v. Superior Court,13 also a suit for increased child
support by a mother against a nonresident father. Further, the Miller court
concluded that allowing the exercise of visitation rights to serve as a basis for
jurisdiction would have a detrimental effect on parental visitation.' 4
The "minimum contacts" standard applied in Miller was first articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.'5
This standard has since become the test by which courts determine whether the
due process rights of a nonresident defendant would be violated by a state's
exercise of personal jurisdiction.' 6 The Court stated that to comply with due
process requirements, a defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum state such that the "maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "17
In International Shoe the Supreme Court sought to balance a state's need to
redress the grievances of its citizens with an individual's need to be free from the
unreasonable burden of defending in any forum in which a plaintiff might chose
to bring an action.1 8 The factors the Court considered relevant in the balancing
process included the following: whether it would be inconvenient for the de-
fendant to come to the forum, whether the defendant's activities in the state had
been continuous and systematic, whether those activities in the state gave rise to
the action, and the quality and nature of the activities. 19
Since International Shoe, the Court has suggested certain guidelines that a
court should use in determining whether minimum contacts are present. One of
12. Id. at 682, 318 S.E.2d at 104.
13. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
14. Miller, 313 N.C. at 478-80, 329 S.E.2d at 666-67.
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe expanded the concept of jurisdiction from the old
territorial standard articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (state had jurisdiction only
over those within its borders), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 443 U.S. 186 (1977), to the new
standard of "minimum contacts" with the forum state. International Shoe was predicated on the
growing impact of interstate commercial transactions and the need to protect the state's residents in
those transactions. Accordingly, if a defendant had contacts with a state indicating an attempt to
derive benefits from the state (especially economic benefits), the defendant was thought to have sub-
mitted to the state's jurisdiction. Those contacts would "make it reasonable and just, according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice" for the state to exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
16. See, eg., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (minimum contacts
requirement satisfied by the contract which was the subject of the suit); cf. Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz,
285 N.C. 700, 703-04, 208 S.E.2d 676, 678-79 (1974) (noting that recent United States Supreme
Court cases beginning with International Shoe indicate a modem trend toward jurisdiction based on
relationship between forum and subject matter of litigation).
17. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
18. Id. at 317.
19. Id. at 317-19.
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the earliest guidelines was set out in Hanson v. Denckla2 ° in which the Court
indicated that the defendant's contacts must include some purposeful activity
through which the defendant takes advantage of the protections and benefits of
the forum state's laws. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson2 t the
Court emphasized an additional inquiry: whether the defendant could foresee
that he or she would be required to defend a suit in a particular forum. Two
other relevant considerations that have been articulated by the Court are
whether the defendant could foresee that his or her actions would "cause an
effect" in the state22 and whether the relationship between the defendant, the
forum, and the type of litigation giving rise to the jurisdiction question is strong
enough to give the forum an interest in resolving the litigation.2 3
Although the Supreme Court has articulated numerous criteria by which a
court may measure the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with a particular
state, it is important to recognize that most courts use the phrase "minimum
contacts" as a shorthand reference to the underlying principle of fairness. 2 4 The
real concern is whether it is fair for a party to be required to defend an action in
a particular forum. 25 If a defendant has sufficient contacts with the state, exer-
cising jurisdiction is fair. If the defendant's contacts with the state are too tenu-
ous, an exercise of jurisdiction is unjust.
In applying the Supreme Court's criteria for the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction to the facts of Miller, Justice Mitchell indicated that the North Car-
olina courts have established a two-step analysis to determine whether in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a nonresident is warranted. 26 First, personal
jurisdiction over the defendant must be authorized by statute.27 Second, the
exercise of that jurisdiction must not violate the defendant's due process
20. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (Delaware trustee not subject to Florida jurisdiction simply be-
cause the appointees and beneficiaries of trust were domiciled there).
21. 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (because defendants could not reasonably anticipate being
haled into Oklahoma court, jurisdiction was denied in products liability suit against New York auto-
mobile dealer and its wholesaler who did no business in Oklahoma).
22. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (California jurisdiction upheld in libel suit because
defendant's intentional conduct in Florida was calculated to cause injury in California).
23. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (jurisdiction in libel suit based on distri-
bution of libelous material in forum state and plaintiff's injury from it there).
24. See, eg., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 441, 176
N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961) ("[P]rocedural rules must be designed and appraised in the light of what is
fair and just to both sides in the dispute."); see also Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdic-
tion and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300 (1970) (focusing on courts' confu-
sion in analyzing jurisdictional questions and suggesting that because the majority of cases falls
within the "fair play standard," the time-consuming minimum contacts analysis should be reserved
for those cases that are truly questionable).
25. The International Shoe court stated:
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
26. Miller, 313 N.C. at 476, 329 S.E.2d at 665.
27. See, eg., Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 675, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630
(1977).
[Vol. 64
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
rights.28 The court has examined the due process step of the analysis by focus-
ing on two questions: (1) whether the defendant received actual notice of the
action,29 and (2) whether the defendant engaged in purposeful activity in North
Carolina sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.30
The question of statutory authorization is a threshold inquiry; if there is no
authorization, the analysis goes no further. Similarly, the forum state's reason-
able assurance of actual notice to the defendant is a threshold inquiry. Once the
court has satisfied itself that these requirements are met, it must undertake the
more subjective "purposeful activity" inquiry.
In the first step of its analysis, the court must examine the North Carolina
long-arm statute, which enumerates those circumstances in which a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 31 North Carolina
courts and federal courts construing North Carolina law have repeatedly held
that the long-arm statute is to be construed as liberally as possible within the
limits of due process.32 Those limits are the focus of the second step of the
analysis: Has the defendant had adequate notice and does the defendant have
sufficient contacts with the state to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction?
The question whether a defendant's contacts with a state are sufficient to
subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction is fact-specific and involves a bal-
ancing process. Thus, minimum contacts questions are examined on a case-by-
case basis, and few bright line rules have emerged. 33
28. Id.
29. Byrum v. Register's Truck & Equip. Co., 32 N.C. App. 135, 138, 231 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1977)
(citing Goldman v. Parkland, 277 N.C. 223, 229, 176 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1970)). Notice is achieved by
service of process. A judgment is invalid if the defendant received no notice and therefore had no
chance to be heard. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 84, 47 S.E.2d 798, 800 (1948).
30. Byrum v. Register's Truck & Equip. Co., 32 N.C. App. 135, 138, 231 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1977)
(citing Goldman v. Parkland, 277 N.C. 223, 229, 176 S.E.2d 784, 788 (1970)).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983). The statute specifies that a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who:
1. is a person present within the state, a resident of the state, or is engaged in substantial
activity within the state;
2. causes an injury by an act or omission within the state;
3. causes an injury within the state by a foreign act or omission;
4. offers local goods or participates in local services or contracts;
5. possesses or controls local property;
6. is an officer or director of a domestic corporation;
7. is under an obligation of security instrument within the state;
8. is a party to an insurance contract and plaintiff was a resident of the state when the claim
arose or when the event out of which the claim arose occurred within the state;
9. is subject to state taxes;
10. is in a marital relationship with a resident of the state.
Statutes of this kind often are called long-arm statutes because they reach beyond the state's territo-
rial borders. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 1068, at 243 (1969).
32. Modern Globe, Inc. v. Spellman, 45 N.C. App. 615, 623, 263 S.E.2d 859, 862, cert. denied,
300 N.C. 373, 267 S.E.2d 677 (1980); Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enter., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1366
(M.D.N.C. 1973). This liberal interpretation was carried to its logical limit in a trademark infringe-
ment suit in which the court held that "the prevailing law in North Carolina presumes the existence
of in personam jurisdiction." Southern Case, Inc. v. Management Recruiters, Int'l, 544 F. Supp.
403, 405 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
33. The question whether minimum contacts exist "cannot be answered by applying a mechani-
1986]
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Although the primary focus in a minimum contacts analysis is the defend-
ant and his or her purposeful activity, International Shoe and its progeny require
a balancing of interests of all parties involved-those of the state and the plain-
tiff as well as those of the defendant. 34 Courts have delineated factors to be
considered in the balancing process under North Carolina law, including the
quantity and quality of the contacts,35 the connection between the cause of ac-
tion and the contacts, 36 the forum state's interest in protecting its residents,37
convenience of the forum,38 and fairness to both the plaintiff and the defend-
ant.39 Understandably, such determinations turn on specific facts; even minor
variations in the facts presented are likely to produce differing results.
The traditional factors used to decide jurisdictional questions are derived
primarily from tort and contract law.4° The "purposeful activity" analysis used
in tort and contract decisions frequently focuses on the defendant's attempts to
derive economic benefit through contacts with the state.4 1 The parties to such
actions typically are involved in arms-length relationships with one another, and
the factors that bear on the decision whether to allow personal jurisdiction re-
flect this perspective. In Vishay Intertechnology v. Delta International Corp.,42
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied
cal formula or rule of thumb, but by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable and just in the circum-
stances." Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 625, 133 S.E.2d 492, 497 (1963).
34. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
35. Parris v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 282, 253 S.E.2d 29 (1979) (De-
fendant insurance company was subject to North Carolina jurisdiction when its contacts included a
listing in North Carolina telephone directories, a toll-free number to call from North Carolina, gen-
eral agents who handled defendant's insurance listed in various North Carolina cities, and a letter to
plaintiff's counsel in North Carolina regarding renewal of term life insurance.), disc. rev. denied, 297
N.C. 455, 256 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
36. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Mohasco Corp., 442 F. Supp. 424 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (solicitation,
advertising, and negotiations on a contract constituted attempts to enter North Carolina textile ma-
chinery market and were related to the causes of action in negligence, misrepresentation, and unfair
and deceptive practices).
37. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982) (North
Carolina's interests in the case included that plaintiff was a North Carolina resident, that plaintiff
sought relief under the North Carolina unfair trade practices legislation, and that the action centered
on goods which would have been manufactured within the State).
38. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Eways, 46 N.C. App. 466, 265 S.E.2d 637 (1980)
(although convenience of forum was a consideration, mere ownership of property in the state that
was unconnected with the controversy did not support jurisdiction).
39. Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977) (jurisdiction
upheld in suit for breach of employment contract when defendant's contacts were solicitations of
orders to buy coins from North Carolina citizens, $50,000 worth of business in 147 transactions, and
sending a representative to appraise a collection).
40. The landmark Supreme Court decisions, see supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text, were
contract, tort, and business cases, as were all the North Carolina and federal decisions cited supra
notes 35-39. The notable exception to this pattern is Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978),
the only domestic relations case involving a personal jurisdiction issue the Supreme Court has heard.
Kulko is discussed at length infra at notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
41. See Hankins v. Somers, 39 N.C. App. 617, 251 S.E.2d 640 (1979) (jurisdiction in tort action
upheld because defendant had contact with the state when he sold his wire art within its borders,
although the sale was unrelated to the cause of action); Forman & Zuckerman, P.A. v. Schupak, 31
N.C. App. 62, 228 S.E.2d 503 (1976) (jurisdiction over nonresident attorneys established in contract
action because defendants had sought out plaintiffs, had supervised plaintiffs' work, and had visited
the state to attend a hearing related to the case for which they had hired plaintiffs), disc. rev. denied,
292 N.C. 264, 233 S.E.2d 391, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 804 (1977).
42. 696 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
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North Carolina law to uphold jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on the
basis of three letters and five telephone calls to North Carolina.43 The court
concluded that those contacts were related to the causes of action-including
unfair business practices, tortious interference with contract, and slander-and
that the contacts were part of defendant's efforts to derive economic benefit
through its contacts with the State.44
On the other hand, the North Carolina Supreme Court found no jurisdic-
tion over a New York resident in a suit on a promissory note executed in favor
of a North Carolina resident. Defendant had signed the note for his brother and
thus derived "no attending commercial benefits to himself enforceable in the
courts of North Carolina." 45 Because the relationship between the signor and
the debtor was not at arms-length, the court was unwilling to find the "pur-
poseful activity" that normally would be present in signing a promissory note.
Although most minimum contacts decisions have arisen in the context of
tort and contract disputes, North Carolina courts have used the same analytical
framework in domestic relations cases involving nonresidents. Because an ali-
mony or child support order is a personal judgment against the debtor, due pro-
cess restrictions apply, 46 and a court must have proper jurisdiction to enter a
valid order against a defendant.47 Statutory authorization for such jurisdiction
usually exists. The North Carolina courts have held, for example, that the long-
arm statute permits the assertion of personal jurisdiction in an action against a
nonresident spouse for support on the grounds of abandonment4 8 as well as in
an action for arrearages in support payments.4 9
In Moore v. Wilson50 plaintiff mother brought an action against the nonresi-
dent father for child support. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion.5 1 The court of appeals held that because defendant had signed an
acknowledgment of paternity and a voluntary agreement to support the child in
North Carolina, he had "engaged in some act or conduct by which he may be
said to have invoked the benefits and protections of the law of the forum." '52
In Miller the supreme court applied the North Carolina framework for
minimum contacts analysis. Finding it unnecessary to address the statutory au-
43. Id. at 1068.
44. Id. at 1069.
45. United Buying Group, Inc. v. Coleman, 296 N.C. 510, 517, 251 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1979).
46. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. Southern v. Southern, 43 N.C. App. 159, 258 S.E.2d 422 (1979) (court refused to enforce
decree from English court requiring husband to pay alimony and child support arrearages when
there was no showing that the English court had jurisdiction over the husband).
48. Sherwood v. Sherwood, 29 N.C. App. 112, 223 S.E.2d 509 (1976) (abandonment of resident
plaintiff constituted an "injury to person or property" under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(3) (1983)
and was statutory grounds for personal jurisdiction).
49. Moore v. Wilson, 62 N.C. App. 746, 303 S.E.2d 564 (1983).
50. 62 N.C. App. 746, 303 S.E.2d 564 (1983).
51. Id. at 746, 303 S.E.2d at 564.
52. Id. at 748, 303 S.E.2d at 565 (findings of fact included that defendant had been convicted of
criminal nonsupport in North Carolina, had been held in contempt of that criminal order, and finally
had complied with the order and had made payments for six years).
1986]
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thority aspect of the two-step analysis, the court focused on whether an exercise
of jurisdiction would violate defendant's due process rights. After examining the
factors of the minimum contacts balance in light of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Kulko v. Superior Court,53 the Miller court concluded that
defendant lacked sufficient contacts to justify jurisdiction.
Justice Mitchell indicated that Kulko mandated the finding of no jurisdic-
tion in Miller. Both Kulko and Miller involved actions for child support
brought against nonresident defendants. In Kulko the father, a New York resi-
dent with custody of his children, agreed to let the children live with their
mother in California. The California Superior Court held that it could properly
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant father in a suit for custody and increased
child support, reasoning that "by consenting to his children's living in Califor-
nia, appellant had 'caused an effect in th[e] state' warranting the exercise of
jurisdiction over him."' 54 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the father's acquiescence in the children's desire to live with their mother
did not establish the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction.55
Although the Miller court concluded that it was compelled by Kulko to find
that defendant's contacts were insufficient to support an exercise of personal
jurisdictin,56 a close examination of the facts could reasonably dictate a differ-
ent result. Arguably, the facts in Miller were too dissimilar to those of Kulko to
compel the court's finding. 57
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that in Miller, as in Kulko, de-
fendant had not engaged in any purposeful activity by which he had availed
himself of the protections and benefits of North Carolina law.58 In Kulko, how-
ever, a noncustodial parent brought suit in the state of her residence. The chil-
dren had lived in that state on a temporary basis and with only the
"acquiescence" of the father, in whose custody the children remained.59 This
situation differs from the more common fact pattern found in Miller, in which
the custodial parent brought suit in the domicile of herself and the child.
Although the court observed that the child's presence in North Carolina was
due solely to plaintiff's decision to live there,60 it should be noted that defendant
had signed a formal agreement providing that the child would reside with plain-
tiff.61 The father in Miller had done much more than acquiesce; he had given
legal approval of the child's residence with the mother when he gave up his
custody rights. If not quite purposeful activity, defendant's behavior in Miller
was at least more purposeful than the mere acquiescence of defendant in Kulko.
53. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
54. Id. at 88-89 (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627, 628 (1976), aff'd, 19
Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)).
55. Id. at 101.
56. Miller, 313 N.C. at 478, 329 S.E.2d at 666.
57. See Miller, 69 N.C. App. at 682-83, 318 S.E.2d at 104.
58. Miller, 313 N.C. at 480-81, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
59. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 88.
60. Miller, 313 N.C. at 479, 329 S.E.2d at 666.
61. Id. at 475, 329 S.E.2d at 664.
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In addition to declaring that defendant had not engaged in purposeful activ-
ity in North Carolina, the Miller court concluded that under Kulko the quantity
and quality of defendant's contacts were insufficient to establish personal juris-
diction. 62 Specifically, the court indicated that defendant's occasional visits to
the State to see his child could not serve as the basis for establishing jurisdiction.
Quoting from Kulko, the court noted, "'To hold such temporary visits to a State
a basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over unrelated actions aris-
ing in the future would make a mockery of the limitations on state jurisdiction
imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment.' "63 Although recognizing that the fa-
ther's visits to California in Kulko were generally "fewer and more distant in
time from the litigation"64 than were the visits in Miller,65 the court stated that
"[t]he visits by this defendant to North Carolina... were no less temporary than
those in Kulko and were so unrelated to this action that he could not have rea-
sonably anticipated being subject to suit here." 66 It is difficult to imagine, how-
ever, what kinds of contacts would be more related to an action for child support
than visits to and payments for the child whose support is in controversy. Fur-
thermore, regular visits to one's child are less temporary and more purposeful
than the military stopovers that occurred in Kulko. 67
In a broad sense, defendant's contacts with North Carolina in Miller were
not only the trips made to the State to visit his child. The nature of his relation-
ship with his daughter could be considered a form of contact. In examining the
quality and quantity of contacts a defendant has with a state, courts have long
recognized that a single contractual agreement may be sufficient contact with the
forum state if that agreement is the subject of the controversy and if it has a
sufficient nexus to the forum.68 In essence, it is the relationship established by
contract that justifies the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The parent-child re-
lationship, although not entered into voluntarily by both parties, is as deserving
of protection as the relationship between contracting parties. The nonresident
parent's interest in state laws protecting his or her parental rights in the parent-
child relationship is as strong as the nonresident contracting party's interest in
state laws protecting rights established by contract.
The Miller court also stated that although North Carolina may have been
the most convenient forum in which to bring the action, convenience alone is not
a sufficient basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 69 A fur-
ther review of Kulko, however, clearly shows that the Kulko Court did consider
62. Id. at 479, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
63. Id. at 479-80, 329 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93).
64. Id. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
65. The visits to California by Mr. Kulko to which the Miller court alluded consisted of a 3-day
military stopover in 1959 and a 24-hour stopover in 1960-two visits 16 years prior to the lawsuit
and before children were born to the Kulkos. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 93.
66. Miller, 313 N.C. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667 (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
68. See, eg., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 208 S.E.2d 676 (1974);
Byrum v. Register's Truck & Equip. Co., 32 N.C. App. 135, 231 S.E.2d 39 (1977).
69. Miller, 313 N.C. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
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which state would provide the most convenient and fairest forum.70 Because
New York was the Kulko's marital domicile, because the father had custody
there and provided a home for the children there, and because the mother had
left the family domicile when she moved to California, a reasonable parent in the
father's position would not have expected to travel 3,000 miles to litigate a fam-
ily question. The fairest and most convenient forum clearly was New York.
North Carolina courts have also identified convenience and fairness of the
forum as factors in the balancing process.71 Convenience to the parties must be
examined in light of alternative forums and the location of evidence and wit-
nesses. In Miller, because both plaintiff and the child had lived in North Caro-
lina for nine years at the time the child support action was brought, most of their
evidence and witnesses would have been in that State. Defendant would have
had to bring his evidence from Tokyo regardless of the forum chosen; thus, the
burden of defending might not have been significantly greater in North Carolina
than in California (defendant's domicile) or Illinois (the marital domicile).
The Miller court considered each factor of the balancing process sepa-
rately.72 Traditionally, however, these factors are considered together so that
competing interests can be balanced. As the court indicated, none of defendant's
contacts with North Carolina was sufficient in itself to establish personal juris-
diction.73 However, defendant's contacts should have been viewed cumulatively
in light of competing interests, and all the factors of the minimum contacts anal-
ysis should have been considered in the balancing process. The parent-child
relationship, the convenience of the North Carolina forum, the relationship of
defendant's contacts to the cause of action, and North Carolina's interest in the
welfare of children domiciled in the State should have been balanced against the
burden of defending in North Carolina, the interest in preserving state sover-
eignty, and defendant's minimal purposeful activity.
Although a strict minimum contacts analysis focused on purposeful activity
could lead to the decision the court reached in Miller, such an analysis is incon-
sistent with North Carolina's stated policy of interpreting the long-arm statute
as broadly as possible within the limits of due process.74 In addition, the Miller
court failed to consider the policy implications of applying a contract and tort
oriented analysis in a domestic relations context.
70. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97-98.
71. See, eg., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Washington, 65 N.C. App. 38, 308 S.E.2d 758 (1983)
(personal jurisdiction in declaratory judgment action by insurers over Florida residents involved in
an automobile accident in North Carolina was upheld because Florida residents had filed suit in
North Carolina regarding the accident), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 624, 315 S.E.2d 690 (1984); see
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
72. The court discussed each factor in a separate paragraph of the opinion; it did not discuss
the interplay of the factors. Miller, 313 N.C. at 479-481, 329 S.E.2d at 666-67.
73. The court reached a conclusion in each paragraph discussing each factor as to whether the
presence or absence of that factor would establish jurisdiction. For example, the court said, "The
fact that defendant in the instant case visited the child in North Carolina approximately six times
between 1973 and 1981 is also insufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction over him." Id. at 479,
329 S.E.2d at 667. And again, "This fact [that North Carolina may be the most convenient forum]
does not confer personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant." Id. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
74. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Several societal trends and related public policy considerations are relevant
to the question whether traditional minimum contacts analysis should be used in
domestic relations cases. American society has become increasingly transient.7 5
When access to transportation was more limited, both parties to a marriage were
likely to remain in the same geographic area after a divorce. Therefore, the
marital domicile was considered the proper forum for resolving difficulties aris-
ing out of that relationship. 76 Today, however, ease of transportation often may
lead to the parties' leaving the marital domicile. 77 Because a basic concern in
deciding the fairness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is
that the burden of defending not be too heavy, 78 it may be appropriate to deter-
mine whether the burden of defending would be heavier in the marital domicile
or in the plaintiff's new domicile. Moreover, because the plaintiff usually is the
dependent spouse, he or she may be the party least able to bear the expense of
litigating in a foreign forum. Nevertheless, under traditional minimum contacts
analysis, this party may be required to do so.79 In Miller, because both parents
had left the marital domicile, the court could have based its decision on whether
the burden on defendant to come from Tokyo to defend in North Carolina was
greater than it would have been to defend in California or Illinois.
Another consideration in certain domestic relations cases is the special vul-
nerability of children. As the real party in interest, the child is the one who
suffers when the custodial parent cannot afford to sue for child support in a
foreign forum.80 In considering fairness to litigants, the Miller court should
have weighed the child's limited resources and mobility against the inconven-
ience to defendant of defending in North Carolina.
A further and perhaps most important consideration in establishing per-
sonal jurisdiction in a domestic relations case involving children is the parent-
child relationship. 8 1 Unlike the arms-length relationship in contract or tort
75. Comment, Securing Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents in Spousal and Child Support
Suits: Is California'sLong-Arn Too Short?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 895, 901-02 (1980) (suggesting a
new analysis for California jurisdiction questions in domestic relations cases because policy reasons
have left the old analysis too rigid). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
299 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting), Justice Brennan addressed the relevance of increased commer-
cialism, communication, and ease of transportation to the question of jurisdictional scope, citing
statistics indicating that since the decision in International Shoe in 1945, the number of passenger
miles flown on domestic and international flights had increased from 450 million to 176 billion in
1976. Automobile vehicle miles during the same period increased 500%. Justice Brennan noted
that not only did this increase in activity increase contacts with other states, it also made defending
in another jurisdiction less burdensome for a nonresident party. Id. at 308-09 & n.13
Further statistics document the transient nature of contemporary society. For example, 44.6%
of respondents in the 1980 census reported that they lived in different houses in 1980 than the ones
they lived in in 1975. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1984, at 16 (1984).
76. Comment, supra note 75, at 901-02.
77. Id. at 902.
78. In International Shoe, for example, the Supreme Court observed: "To require the corpora-
tion in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where it
carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on
the corporation to comport with due process." International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
79. Comment, supra note 75, at 902.
80. Id. at 903-04.
81. Id. at 904-05.
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cases, the parent-child relationship is personal and continuing. Although the
relationship gives rise to legal rights and responsibilities, those rights and re-
sponsibilities are not based on the legal structure of a contract in which both
sides have equal bargaining power, nor are they based on some arms-length vio-
lation of a tort duty owed to an unrelated third party. The parties to the parent-
child relationship are not in equal positions; the child is dependent on the par-
ent. Accordingly, when a controversy concerning that parent- child relationship
arises, rules that apply to other types of relationships require modification before
they may be fairly applied.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the unique role of the
family in society and has concluded that the role "requires that constitutional
principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of par-
ents and children."' 82 Providing for a child's welfare clearly is a "special need";
when a controversy arises in that context, it is well within the bounds of reason
and fairness to suggest that the sensitivity and flexibility of which the Court has
spoken warrant a relaxation of the strict minimum contacts analysis so that per-
sonal jurisdiction may be established over a nonresident defendant.
Other policy reasons support an expansive approach to the minimum con-
tacts analysis in domestic relations cases. Although the state's interest in the
case is a factor in the traditional minimum contacts test,8 3 it is of special signifi-
cance in a domestic relations case involving children. Foremost is the state's
interest in the child's welfare. In North Carolina that interest has been consid-
ered so strong that even an agreement between the parents will not deprive the
courts of their inherent and statutory power to protect a child's interests and
provide for his or her welfare.8 4 Furthermore, the state has a more abstract
economic and sociological interest in the well-being of the child; generally, chil-
dren who are taken care of are more likely to grow up to be productive citizens
than are children who are not well provided for by their parents.85
Related to the state's interest is the power that state courts already have
over custody arrangements. Courts are not required to find in personam juris-
diction to adjudicate child custody disputes.8 6 Although a child support order is
82. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion) (affirming right of pregnant
minor to obtain abortion without parental or court consent).
83. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
84. Bishop v. Bishop, 245 N.C. 573, 96 S.E.2d 721 (1957) (consent of parties to consent agree-
ment stipulating child support payments did not deprive court ofjurisdiction to increase payments).
85. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 220 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice
Stone noted that the maintenance and support of children within a state is of particular concern to
the government. "Their [the children's] tender years, their inability to provide for themselves, the
importance to the state that its future citizens should be clothed, nourished and suitably educated,
are considerations which lead all civilized countries to assume some control over the maintenance of
minors." Id.; see also Comment, supra note 75, at 906 (noting that the interests of state government
are both economic and sociological).
86. A custody order does not require in personam jurisdiction because it imposes no liability or
civil obligation on either party. The jurisdiction essential to issue a valid custody order is granted by
statute. North Carolina's codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act generally au-
thorizes jurisdiction if the forum state has been the residence of the child for at least six months, if
the child and at least one contestant have a significant connection with the state, if the child is
present in the state and emergency protection is required for the child's welfare, or if the forum state
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a personal judgment and must be rendered in compliance with due process re-
quirements, the connection between the power to order custody and the power
to order support is a close one. In resolving a dispute between a New York
couple in Finlay v. Finlay,87 Judge Cardozo said, "The jurisdiction of a state to
regulate the custody of infants found within its territory does not depend upon
the domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the protection that is due to the
incompetent or helpless."8 8 Justice Frankfurter quoted Finlay to support the
proposition that states must be free to do what is best for children when they are
responsible for the care of minors within their borders.8 9 The protection Judge
Cardozo envisioned surely includes ensuring that states can reach those respon-
sible for the children's support.
A recommendation to expand the minimum contacts test in domestic rela-
tions cases is not made without caveats. First, states have a recognized interest
in preventing forum shopping.90 In a federal system, the sovereign power of
each state to try cases in its courts creates a limitation on the sovereignty of
every other state. The reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant "must be assessed 'in the context of our federal system of govern-
ment.' "91 Particularly in domestic relations cases, there are likely to be a
number of jurisdictions that have some connection to the parties involved. The
minimum contacts analysis, however, remains a balancing process; the factors of
the expanded analysis should be examined just as the factors in the traditional
analysis are examined. If an infringement of state sovereignty is found in either
case, a court must refuse to exercise jurisdiction.
A second caveat is based on the existence of mechanisms such as the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA);92 this Act may already
is the most convenient and it appears that no other state could exercise jurisdiction. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50A-3 (1984); see also 3 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 222 (4th ed. 1979)
(discussing jurisdiction and procedure in child custody cases).
87. 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
88. Id. at 431, 148 N.E. at 625.
89. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (domestic relations
case appealed from the North Carolina Supreme Court).
90. See, eg., Hamann v. American Motors Co., 131 Mich. App. 605, 609, 345 N.W.2d 699, 701
(1983) (applying doctrine of forum non conveniens).
91. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980) (quoting Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court noted that
the minimum contacts [test], in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguish-
able, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system.
Id. at 291-92; see also Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 603
(7th Cir. 1979) (noting that an important factor in the determination of jurisdiction in a commercial
contract dispute is "'the best interests of the international and interstate systems"' (quoting RE-
STATEME T (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT oF LAWS § 24 comment b (1969))); Note, Burger King v.
Rudzewicz: Flexibility v. Predictability in In Personam Jurisdiction, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 880, 890-91
(1986) (noting that principles of federalism support a restrictive approach to jurisdiction).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -32 (1984). The Act (or similar legislation) has been enacted
in all 50 states to extend the enforcement of support duties. 2 R. LEE, supra note 86, § 169, at 337.
URESA
allows an "obligee," any person owed a support duty, to file a petition in his or her home
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protect a child's welfare without jurisdictional problems. This avenue of re-
course was suggested by both the Kulko and Miller courts.93 The limitations of
the Act, however, include lengthy time delays, dilatory prosecution of plaintiffs'
cases, and a variety of political problems that render the Act ineffectual in han-
dling many child support actions.94
A final policy consideration is one noted by the Miller court when it ex-
pressed the fear of an adverse effect on visitation of children by noncustodial
nonresident parents. 95 The court said that if the minimum contacts standard
were satisfied by visiting the child in the forum state, a parent could visit a child
only at the risk of subjecting himself or herself to the forum state's jurisdiction. 96
The court failed to mention, however, that a nonresident parent is subject to
service of process each time he or she visits the child in the state because the
state has jurisdiction over natural persons within its borders.97 Moreover, if the
parent-child relationship were to be a sufficient basis for minimum contacts, the
parent already would be subject to suit in the forum of the child's residence; the
parent, therefore, would incur no added risk by visiting the child.
The policy considerations discussed in this Note do not suggest the need to
establish a new standard for the minimum contacts analysis. Rather, they indi-
cate that because the traditional analysis is insensitive to the special character of
parent-child relationships, a more expansive approach to personal jurisdiction
questions in domestic relations cases would result in fairer and more consistent
decisions.98 The Miller court's decision was based on an overly broad reading of
Kulko and an unduly narrow application of the minimum contacts standard. It
is time to recognize that familial contacts are as valid in establishing personal
state and receive a hearing on its merits in the "responding state" where the "obligor"
resides. Court-appointed counsel in the responding state relieves the obligee of both the
expense of engaging private counsel and the inconvenience of traveling to a distant forum.
Note, Interstate Enforcement of Support Obligations Through Long Arm Statutes and URESA, 18 J.
FAM. L. 537, 540 (1979-80).
93. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98-100; Miller, 313 N.C. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
94. See Note, supra note 92, at 541. Indifferent prosecution for nonresident plaintiffs may re-
sult in undue delay and poor preparation. Without a personal appearance, there is little likelihood of
sympathy for the destitute plaintiff, and the obligor has a corresponding opportunity to present a
persuasive case. Also, administration of the Act by various government agencies may influence the
order in which petitions are handled. For example, if the program is administered by a branch of the
welfare office, a welfare mother's petition is likely to go through the system before a non-welfare
mother's so that if the petition is successful, the agency may have one less person on its rols. Id.
95. Miller, 313 N.C. at 480, 329 S.E.2d at 667.
96. Id.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1) (1983) (The courts of this State have jurisdiction over a per-
son "in any action.., in which a claim is asserted against a party who when service of process is
made upon such party [is] a natural person present within this State.").
98. Such an expansion is not altogether new to the North Carolina courts. In Sherwood v.
Sherwood, 29 N.C. App. 112, 223 S.E.2d 509 (1976), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that
the exercise ofjurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who had maintained a marital domicile with
plaintiff for nearly two years in North Carolina before abandoning plaintiff and moving to Delaware
was warranted. The court cautiously noted: "Though this ruling expands the concept of personal
jurisdiction, this expansion is limited by the particular circumstances of this case relative to defend-
ant's acts and contacts within the State in addition to the domicile of the plaintiff-spouse as a juris-
dictional basis." Id. at 116, 223 S.E.2d at 512.
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jurisdiction in domestic controversies as economic contacts are in establishing
jurisdiction in business controversies.
For the laws to reach all those "ill disposed neighbors" who assume a re-
sponsibility by maintaining family relationships with North Carolina residents,
the court should analyze the question of personal jurisdiction by reference to the
principle incorporated in the minimum contacts concept-fundamental fairness.
If after a practical consideration of the relevant factors-ongoing parent-child
relationship, special status of children, policy considerations in an increasingly
mobile society, and the more traditional concerns of convenience of the forum,
avoidance of an undue burden on the defendant, the state's interest in the mat-
ter, and the relationship of the defendant's contacts to the cause of action-it
appears fair for a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,
then due process is not violated by an exercise of such jurisdiction. North Caro-
lina's commitment should be to a fair and reasoned analysis encompassing not
only the specific contacts of an individual, but how those contacts relate to the
cause of action and to the residents of the State; in personam jurisdiction permits
nothing less.
JULIA MOORE CARPENTER
1986]
